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GUEST STATUTES IN THE CONFLICT OF LAWS-TOWARDS
A THEORY OF ENTERPRISE LIABILITY UNDER
"FORESEEABLE AND INSURABLE LAWS": I*
ALBERT A. EHRENZWEIGi
THE Restaters would have it that recovery in tort depends on whether "a
cause of action in tort is created at the place of wrong,"' i.e., "where the last
event necessary to make an actor liable for an alleged tort takes place." 2 This
rule is circuitous and therefore meaningless: neither the existence of a "wrong"
nor the "last event" can be ascertained without reference to the applicable law.
This rule has, therefore, been paraphrased by the author of the Restatemcnt
himself to refer to "the place where the person or thing harmed is situated at
the time of the wrong.' 3 The Restatement rule thus restated, while more mean-
ingful, lacks a rationale and is incorrect in its generality. Based on the long
discarded postulate of vested rights,4 it ignores the relevance of the law of the
place of defendant's conduct in cases of admonitory liability,3 and the impact
of insurance in others.6
It is my basic contention that all through the field of choice of law the lex
fori must remain the starting point with some or most of our traditional con-
flicts rules functioning as exceptions. 7 In the present series of articles, I shall
*The first of three Articles by the author. The second and third will appear in the April
and May issues of the Yale Law .loutnal.
tWalter Perry Johnson Professor of Law, University of California School of Law
(Berkeley).
1. RESTATEISENT, CON-FLICr OF LAws § 384 (1934).
2. Id. § 377.
3. 2 BUxR, CONFLICt OF LAWS § 377.2, at 1287 (1935).
4. See EHREEzwEiG, CoNFLICr OF LAWS 8-13 (1959); Carswell, The Doctrine of
Vested Rights in Private International Law, 8 INT'L & ComP. L.Q. 268 (1959).
5. Ehrenzweig, The Place of Actin9 in Intentional Multistate Torts: Law and Rcason
Versus the Restatement, 36 Mixx. L. REv. 1 (1951). See also 2 HAWER & JA^Es, Tonr
1704 (1956) ; Ehrenzweig, Alienation of Affections in the Conflict of Laws (article to be
published in the Cornell Law Quarterly for Spring 1960).
6. Ehrenzweig, Parental Immunity in the Conflict of Laws: Law and Reason Versus
the Restatement, 23 U. Cm. L. REv. 474, 477-78 (1956) ; Ford, Interspousal Liability for
Automobile Accidents in the Conflict of Laws: Law and Reason Versus the Restatement,
15 U. Pz-. L. REv. 397, 422 (1954). See also Ehrenzweig, Alternative Aetionability in the
Conflict of Laws of Enterprise Liability, 63 JURI. REv. 39 (1951); Note, 57 1x1cn. L
REv. 901 (1959).
7. See Ehrenzveig, The Lex Fori-The Basic Rule in the Conflict of Laws (article to
be published in the Mfichigan Law Review for March 1960). For a preliminary summary,
see Ehrenzweig, Lex Fori-Exception or Rule?, 32 RocKtu MT. L. REv. 13 (1959). Perhaps
the most important exception from the application of the lex fori is the "Rule of Validation"
which prevails in the conflicts law of contracts. See Ehrenzweig, The Real Estate Broker
and the Conflict of Laws, 59 CoLuLI. L REv. 303 (1959); Ehrenzweig, The Statute of
Frauds in the Conflict of Laws, 59 COLUM. L. Rsv. 874 (1959) ; Ehrenzweig, Contracts in
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examine whether, and if so, in what respect, the treatment of conflict of laws
problems concerning the law of "enterprise liability," 8 constitutes an exception
to the lex fori principle. Problems involving automobile guest statutes, products
liability, and vicarious liability have been chosen as a testing ground. A brief
historical survey designed to establish the background for the rejection of
"official" dogma will precede the discussion.
If the law of contracts is the oldest subject of the law of conflict of laws,
the law of torts is its youngest. There was no room for it in the scheme of
either the statutists or of Dutch comity. Damages for delicts were apparently
a matter of remedy, subject to the law of the forum, and injustice was avoided
by the forum's refusal to take jurisdiction where its own law was not properly
applicable to a foreign wrong. In England, torts did not become an independ-
ent subject of conflicts law until the middle of the nineteenth century.9 To be
sure, earlier civil suits against officers of the British Crown relating to their
colonial administration had raised the question whether such officers should
be permitted to justify themselves by invoking colonial law.10 But this ques-
tion had been raised and answered in close analogy to the questions of crim-
inal responsibility which had been discussed ever since Bartolus' Comncn-
taries.11 Wfichter was probably the first scholar to deal with the conflicts law
of torts on a general scale,12 and it was he who apparently inspired Willes,
J., in his now famous opinion in Phillips v. Eyre.18 To 'both Wfichter and
the Conflict of Laws-Part One: Validity, 59 CoLum. L. REv. 973 (1959); Ehrenzweig,
Contracts in the Conflict of Laws-Part Two: Performance (article to be published in the
Columbia Law Review for December 1959) ; Ehrenzweig, Contractual Capacity of Married
Women and Infants in the Conflict of Laws, 43 MINN. L. Rav. 899 (1959) ; Ehrenzweig,
Releases of Concurrent Tortfeasors in the Conflict of Laws (article to be published in the
Virginia Law Review for May 1960); Ehrenzweig, Book Review, 12 J. LEGAL ED. 137
(1959). See also Williams, Land Contracts in the Conflict of Laws-Lex Situls: Rile or
Exception, 11 HASTINGs L.J. 159 (1959). This proposition is limited to bargained contracts
between equal partners. See Ehrenzweig, Adhesion Contracts in the Conflict of Laws, 53
COLUm. L. Ray. 1072 (1953).
8. See generally EHRENZW iG, NEGLIGENCE WITHOUT FAULT (1951).
9. Smith, Torts and the Conflict of Laws, 20 MoD. L. R-v. 447, 450-52 (1957). For a
comprehensive analysis, see Binder, Zur Auflockerung des Deliktsstatuts, 20 RAELs Z, 401
(1955). A more traditional view of the development of English law is taken by HANCOCK,
TORTS IN THE CONFLIcr OF LAWS 1-20 (1942).
10. E.g., Mostyn v. Fabrigas, 1. Cowp. 161, 98 Eng. Rep. 1021 (K.B. 1774).
11. For a later illustration of this persistent connection, see CODEX MAXIMILIANEUS
BAVAuCUS CivIsuS 12.17 (1756), which deals with the problem of "different laws, statutes
and customs prevailing in loco Judicii, Delicti, Rei Sitae, Contractus and Domicili," and
clearly equates "delict" with a crime whose "punishment" is subject to the "laws of the
place where it was committed." Cf. 4.16 of the Codex which, among "penal actions," in-
cludes tort actions under the lex Aquilia (4.16.6) and de effuso vel dejecto (4.16.8). See
generally BATIFFOL, DROIT INTERNATIONAL Priv- 610-14 (3d ed. 1959).
t 12, Wfchter, Ober die Collision der Privatrechtsgesetce vcrschiedener Staten, 24
ARcIlv Fft DIE CIVILISTISCHE PRAxis 230 (1841), 25 id. at 1 (1842), claiming the author-
ity of a long line of later statutists who began their investigations with the lex fori as the
basic law. For other foreign laws, see 2 RABEL, CoNFLiTr OF LAWS 237 (1947).
13. [1870] 6 Q.B. 1.
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Justice Willes the foreign law came into play only as a defense and the l.r
fori continued to govern as the sole affirmative basis of liability.'4 In fact even
this defensive function of foreign law is said to have been limited to its use
"as an authority or ratification in the particular case, and on the peripheral
question of vicarious liability."'15 In any event, English law has to this day
preserved the lex fori as the sole source for liability in tort and has carefully
avoided the nightmare of "an obligation springing to birth out of the soil
at the possibly unsuspecting actor's feet and hanging itself round his neck
like an albatross."'1 6 Yet it is this nightmare, a travesty of the doctrine of
vested rights, which the American Law Institute has bestowed upon us in its
restatement of the conflict of laws-without compelling authority in the his-
tory of American law.
17
For Story, as it had been for his continental ancestors, tort law was but a
branch of the law of remedies.' 8 Since it was thus clearly subject to the law
of the forum, conflicts problems did not arise and Story's first edition of 1834
does not even have a reference to torts in its index.' 0 This general approach
was little changed by the inclusion in the second and third editions of torts
committed on the high seas, since Story's only'conclusion w%-as that "it is not
easy to say in such cases, what laws ought to govern," and that "the most,
that can with any probability be stated is, that in the absence of any general
doctrine to the contrary, either each nation would . . . follow its own laws,
or would apply the rule of reciprocity .... ."20 Bennett, in his fourth and fifth
editions of Story's treatise in effect supports what seems to have been the
original approach by apparently urging nonapplicability of foreign tort laws,
characterizing them as penal in character.2 1 Not until Redfield's sixth and
seventh editions were transitory actions ex delicto for the first time dealt with
in their own right. 22 But being based exclusively on an English case which
14. But cf. Yntema, Book Review, 27 CAN. B. REv. 116, 121 (1949).
15. Smith, supra note 9, at 453.
On this ground the much criticized decision in Machado v. Fontes, [1872] 2 Q.B. 231,
in which liability for a Brazilian libel was found under English law, was entirely proper.
See FALcoNBRiDGE, ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAws 820 (2d ed. 1954) (approving result
on other grounds). Only one with a vested rights approach such as that taken in Pollock,
unsigned note, 13 L.Q. Ray. 233 (1897), could doubt the "logical" accuracy of this decision.
16. Smith, supra note 9, at 457.
17. I have traced this development elsewhere. See Ehrenzweig, The Place of Acisng
in Intentional ifultistate Torts: 'Law and Reason versts the Restatment, 36 MIN:. L
REv. 1, 6-14 (1951).
18. SOyCoNFLiC o" LAws 444-45 (1st ed. 1834).
19. All eight editions of Story's work limited the Conflict of Laws td "Contracts, Rights
and Remedies" in their subtitles.
20. STOaY, CONFLITc OF LAWS 357 (2d ed. 1841) ; STonr, CoNFLICT or LAws 706-07
(3d ed. 1846).
21. STORY, CoNLicr OF LAws 1015-16 (4th ed. 1852) ; STORY, CONFLICT OF LAws 99,&
89 (5th ed. 1857).
22. STORY, CoNucr OF LAWS 403 (6th ed. 1865) ; STORy, CONFLICT or LAws 370 (7th
ed. 1872).
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
applied the ler fori to a foreign tort,23 this treatment remained inconclusive
and unrelated to the so-called "rule" of the Restatement. This latter rule ap-
peared first in Redfield's eighth edition of 1883. An elaborate footnote in the
chapter on crimes, based on a dictum of the United States Supreme Court in
Dennick v. Railroad Co.,24 became the basis of the fateful proposition that
"The true doctrine ... proceeds upon the broad ground of the right of action
given by the law of the foreign state .... ,,25
Any attempt at stating a conflicts rule applicable to torts must discard the
conceptualistic superstructure and history of the Restatement and analyze the
actual holdings of the courts in each typical fact situation. In this analysis it
is essential to distinguish between two types of tort liabilities, namely those
for moral fault which continue primarily to serve a wrongdoer's admonition,
and the much more important liabilities for what I have called "negligence
without fault,"26 i.e., liabilities which, though still phrased in terms of fault,
have come primarily to serve to distribute the losses inevitably caused by
modem enterprise.
It was for the first type, the classic liabilities for moral fault, that the law
of conflict of laws, for the defendant's protection, developed the reference to
the law of the place of wrong. That this reference has -become inappropriate,
and indeed meaningless, in those cases in which the liability has ceased to
presuppose a "wrong," should be obvious. Particularly as to the so-called
negligence liability of motorists, 27 the place-of-wrong formula could produce
intolerable results, as for instance where it would change family (interspousal
and parental) immunities "as members of a family cross state boundaries dur-
ing temporary absences from their home.128 To escape some of these results,
several courageous courts have in effect replaced this formula by a regime of
the law of the parties' common domicile.29 One conclusion seems obvious:
23. Scott v. Lord Seymour, 1 H. & C. 219, 158 Eng. Rep. 865 (Ex. 1862).
24. 103 U.S. 11, 18 (1880).
25. STORY, CONFLICT OF LAWS 845 n. (8th ed. 1883).
Only a few years earlier application of the lex fori to foreign torts had been called a
rule "almost too familiar ... for discussion or authority." Anderson v. Milwaukee & St.
P. Ry., 37 Wis. 321, 322 (1875).
26. EHRENZWEIG, NEGLIGENCE WITHouT FAULT (1951). For approval of my termi-
nology, see, e.g., James, General Products--Should Manufacturers Be Liable Without
Negligence?, 24 TENN. L. REv. 923, 927 (1957).
27. See Kelso, Automobile Accidents and Indiana Conflict of Laws: Current Dilemmas,
33 IND. L.J. 297 (1958) ; Page, Conflict of Laws Problems in Automobile Accidents, 1943
Wis. L. REv. 145; cf. Risjord, Conflict of Laws Applicable to the Standard Automobile
Liability Policy, 1957 Wis. L. Rrv. 586. See also HANCOCK, TORTS IN THE CONFlICT OF
LAws 104-05 (1942).
28. The quotation is from Emery v. Emery, 45 Cal. 2d 421, 428, 289 P.2d 218, 223
(1955) (rejecting lex loci formula).
29. Emery v. Emery, supra note 28; accord, Koplik v. C. P. Trucking Corp., 27 N.J.
1, 11-12, 141 A.2d 34, 40 (1958) (rejecting the lex loci rule as to interspousal immunity, on
the grounds that the rule would "interfere seriously with a status and a policy which the
state of residence is primarily interested in maintaining"); Haunischild v. Continental
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a court which has refused to apply the place-of-wrong "rule" where it would
establish a family immunity unknown to the forum will hesitate to apply that
rule to other foreign limitations on liabilities existing under its own law. In
this context, those statutes which limit the liability of the motorist to his guest
invite discussion of the policies underlying enterprise liability as such and the
impact of these policies on the conflicts law in this field.
At the present time twenty-nine states have either enacted such "guest
statutes" or reached a similar position in their common law.30 The rationale
underlying these statutes, of course, bears decisively on their applicability in
other jurisdictions. At the outset we may discount a rationale related to the
standard of care. The motorist who has invited a guest, should not and will
not drive more or less carefully according to whether he, or his liability in-
surer, will be held liable merely for his gross negligence or for whatever the
jury may find to have been negligence, with or without moral fault. Thus it
would clearly be improper to justify subjection of this liability to the law of
the place of wrong on the ground that it is admonitory in character.
Nor can guest statutes be rationalized as obviating "the proverbial ingrati-
tude of the dog that bites the hand that feeds him."' This rationale would
fail completely in the vast majority of cases where the host carries liability
insurance, and will become totally meaningless with the achievement of the
goal of general or near-general insurance which, with or without compulsion,
is sought by both the public and the insurance industry.32 Even in the ab-
sence of insurance, where this rationale could realistically be invoked, it could
not justify a conflicts rule referring to thelaw of the place of the accident, since
such a rationale could hardly be adequately served by discouraging a guest
from being "ungrateful" only in half of the states which he might traverse.
There remains then the usual argument that guest statutes are designed to
put a barrier in the way of vexatious litigation which would result from col-
lusion between guest and host against the latter's liability insurer.m It has
been doubted whether collusion is less likely if the scope of liability is re-
duced. But even if there were substance to this argument, it could not justify
Cas. Co., 7 Wis. 2d 130, 95 N.WA2d 814 (1959) ; see Comment, Functional Application of
Conflict of Law Rules in Tort Cases, 44 YALE L.J. 1233 (1935).
30. Twenty-seven states have guest statutes. For collection, see Note, 34 IxN. LJ. 338
n2 (1959). In addition, Georgia is sometimes classified as a guest statute state. See, e.g.,
Comment, 54 Nw. U.L. R-v. 263, 264 n.3 (1959). The Georgia statute, although not strict-
ly speaking a guest statute, has been so construed by the courts. See GA. CODE .AN.. § 63-
301 & annot. (1957). Massachusetts holds the host liable to his guest only for gross negli-
gence as the result of a common-law development. See Massaletti v. Fitzroy, 228 Mass. 487,
118 N.E. 168 (1917) ; Comment, 35 Mcu. L. Rnv. 804, 805-12 (1937).
31. Chaplowe v. Powsner, 1.19 Conn. 188, 190-91, 175 AtL 470, 471 (1934), quoting
from Crawford v. Foster, 110 Cal. App. 81, 87, 293 Pac. 841, 843 (Dist. Ct. App. 1930).
32. See EHRENZWEG, "FULL A" INSURANCE FOR THE TaRAnc Vxcrim-A VoLrUN-
TARy COmPENSATiox PLAN (1954) ; GpmmE, TRaA c Vicrims (1958) ; Ehrenz, eig, Book
Review, 11 STAN. L. REV. 400 (1959).
33. Cf. Silver v. Silver, 280 U.S. 117, 123 (1929).
34. 2 HARPER & JA Ss, ToRTS 961 (1956). See also Comment, 54 Nw. U.L Rav. 263
(1959).
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a rule which would defeat the insurer's statutory protection whenever the in-
sured car is driven into a state denying such protection.
Notwithstanding the obvious inadequacy of the place-of-wrong rule in the
application of guest statutes, the courts' language in the seventy-odd conflicts
cases which have invoked such statutes points to a virtually unanimous adop-
tion of the rule. This is understandable, though misleading, in view of the
fact that these statutes were the product of the period of the preparation and
promulgation of the Restatement. But fortunately judicial language in this
field does not correctly reflect living law. Nearly one half of the cases, while
phrased in terms of the place of wrong rule, may, and indeed must, be ignored
in testing the actual validity of this rule. In many of them the law of the
forum was the same, or virtually the same, as that of the place of the accident,
and would therefore have produced the same result. 8  In others the court
found liability under a foreign guest statute which a fortiori would have been
found under the common law of the forum, 0 or nonliability under a foreign
common law which a fortiori would have been found under the guest statute
of the forum.3 7 And there are cases in which the decision rested on grounds
other than a choice between common law and a guest statute.38
35. Only inconclusive cases of this type have so far been decided in Illinois, South
Carolina, and Texas. See Keehn v. Braubach, 307 Ill. App. 339, 30 N.E.2d 156 (1940);
Long v. Carolina Baking Co., 190 S.C. 367, 3 S.E.2d 46 (1939) ; Hill v. Cheek, 230 F.2d
104 (5th Cir. 1956) (Texas). For inconclusive cases of this kind from jurisdictions other-
wise committed to the Restatement formula, see note 39 infra; cf. Passer v. Schimmel, 6
Misc. Zd 629, 158 N.Y.S.2d 694 (Sup. Ct. 1956) (applying New Jersey law concerning
liability to licensees while stating that New York law "similar").
36. Minnesota: Thieman v. Johnson, 257 F.2d 129 (8th Cir. 1958) ; Ressmeyer v. Jones,
210 Minn. 423, 298 N.W. 709 (1941) ; Missouri: Wilcox v. Swenson, 324 S.W.2d 664 (Mo.
1959) ; Barnes v. Lackey, 319 S.W.2d 638 (Mo. 1959) ; Taylor v. Laderman, 349 Mo. 415,
161 S.W.2d 253 (1942); New Hampshire: McAllister v. Maltais, 154 A.2d 456 (N.H.
1959) ; Desrosiers v. Cloutier, 92 N.H. 100, 25 A.2d 123 (1942) ; Laplante v. Rousseau, 91
N.H. 330, 18 A.2d 777 (1941) ; New Jersey: Harber v. Graham, 105 N.J.L. 213, 143 Atl.
340 (Ct. Err. & App. 1928); Crothers v. Caroselli, 125 N.J.L. 403, 16 A.2d 341 (Sup. Ct.
1940) ; Turk v. Turk, 9 N.J. Super. 55, 74 A.2d 900 (App. Div. 1950) ; New York: Selles
v. Smith, 4 N.Y.2d 412, 151 N.E.2d 838, 176 N.Y.S.2d 267 (1958) ; Pennsylvania: Katz v.
Ross, 117 F. Supp. 523 (W.D. Pa. 1953) ; Rodney v. Staman, 371 Pa. 1, 89 A.2d 313 (1952) ;
Julian v. Tornabene, 171 Pa. Super. 333, 90 A.2d 346 (1952); O'Hagan v. Byron, 153 Pa.
Super. 372, 33 A.2d 779 (1943) ; Rhode Island: Powers v. Goodwin, 58 R.I. 372, 192 Atl.
767 (1937); Tennessee: Lucas v. Phillips, 326 S.W.2d 905 (Tenn. 1957); MeMahan v.
McMahan, 38 Tenn. App. 498, 276 S.W.2d 738 (1954) ; Hamilton v. Peoples, 38 Tenn. App.
385, 274 S.W.2d 630 (1954) ; West Virginia: Dodrill v. Young, 102 S.E.d 724 (W. Va.
1958).
37. Sutton v. Bland, 166 Va: 132, 184 S.E. 231 (1936) ; cf. Slaton v. Hall, 168 Ga. 710,
148 S.E. 741 (1929) (nonliability under forum interpretation of foreign common law).
38. In Gratton v. Harwood, 53 R.I. 94, 164 At. 192 (1933), the statute of limitations
of the lex loci was decisive. In Freas v. Sullivan, 130 Ohio St. 486, 200 N.E. 639 (1936)
it was held that under the law of the place of wrong, the guest's contributory negligence
precluded recovery regardless of host's possible gross negligence, and in Kelly v. Simoutis,
90 N.H. 87, 4 A.2_d 868 (1.939), and Smith v. Klute, 277 N.Y. 407, 14 N.E.2d 455 (1938),
plaintiff's status as a "guest" was denied. Naphtali v. Lafazan, 8 App. Div. 2d 22, 186
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About twenty jurisdictions remain which seem committed to the rule, since
they have chosen to apply either the common law 39 or the guest statute 40
of the place of accident notwithstanding a different law prevailing in the
N.Y.S.2d 1010 (1959), involved an owner and his wife who were injured in an Ohio acci-
dent while passengers in their own car. Although the lex loci guest statute was applied
against the wife, it was construed strictly in the husband's favor, resulting in a holding
that he was not a guest and was therefore entitled to recover not only for his own injuries
but for loss of his wife's services and her medical expenses. The latter claim was allowed
on the grounds that under the law of Ohio the cause of action belonged to the husband in
his own right. In Jones v. Avco Mfg. Corp., 218 F.2d 406, 408 (8th Cir. 1955), the court
applied "general rules of agency," rather than one of the "varying state guest statutes."
In Scholle v. Home Mfut. Cas. Co., 273 Wis. 387, 78 N.V2d 902 (1950), the primary basis
of the decision was interspousal immunity. Pando v. Jasper, 133 Colo. 321, 295 P2d 229
(1956), turned upon a question of pleading.
39. California: Loranger v. Nadeau, 215 Cal. 362, 10 P.2d 63 (1932) (both parties
related, forum citizens) ; Victor v. Sperry, 163 Cal. App. 2d 518, 3279 P.2d 729 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1958) (limited recovery under Mexican law) ; Iota: Redfern v. Redfern, 212 Iowa
454, 236 N.W. 399 (1931); Kansas: Pool v. Day, 141 Kan. 195, 40 P.2d 396 (1935) ;
Michigan: Eskovitz v. Berger, 276 Mich. 536, 268 N.W. 883 (1936) ; Massachitscits: Hall
v. Hamel, 244 Mass. 464, 138 N.E. 925 (1923) ; Nebraska: Whitney v. Penrod, 149 Neb.
636, 32 N.W.2d 131. (1948); Nevada: Campbell v. Baskin, 69 Nev. 103, 242 P.2d 290
(1952) ; Ohio: Collins v. McClure, 143 Ohio St. 569, 56 N.E.2d 171 (1944).
It is unrealistic to argue as the lower court did in the last cited case that the forum may
require "its citizens while sojourning in another state to govern their conduct toward one
another according to the law of that state." Collins v. McClure, 49 N.E2d 181, 184 (Ohio
Ct. App. 1942), aff'd, 143 Ohio St. 569, 56 N.E2d 171 (1944).
The following decisions of the same jurisdictions, which apply foreign guest statutes,
are inconclusive since similar statutes of the forum would presumably have led to the same
result. Provost v. Worrall, 142 Cal. App. 2d 367, 298 P.2d 726 (Dist. Ct. App. 1956);
Greiner v. Hicks, 231 Iowa 141, 300 N.V. 727 (1941) ; Kingery v. Donnell, 222 Iowa 241,
268 N.W. 617 (1936); Kokenge v. Holthaus, 165 Kan. 300, 194 P2d 482 (1948); Koster
v. Matson, 139 Kan. 124, 30 P2d 107 (1934) ; Bushouse v. Brom, 297 'Mich. 616, 298 N.W.
303 (1941) ; McCown v. Schram, 139 Neb. 738, 298 N.W. 681 (1941) ; Ifitrovich v. Pay-
lovich, 61 Nev. 62, 1.14 P.2d 1084 (1941) ; Witdock v. Gyselbracht, 67 Ohio App. 120, 36
N.E2d 40 (1940); De Shetler v. Kordt, 43 Ohio App. 236, 183 N.E. 85 (1931).
40. Kentucky: Coulter v. Coulter, 219 F.2d 778 (6th Cir. 1955) ; Huguenot v. Scaff,
294 S.W.2d 547 (Ky. 1956) ; Ansback v. Greenberg, 256 SAV.2d I (Ky. 1952) ; Minnesota:
Phelps v. Benson, 252 Minn. 457, 90 NAV.2d 533 (1958) ; Msissippi: Covington v. Carley,
197 Miss. 535,19 So. 2d 817 (1944) ; Missouri: Allen v. Keck, 212 F.2d 425 (8th Cir. 1954) ;
New Hampshire: Lee v. Chamberlain, 84 N.H. 182, 148 At. 466 (1929); New York:
Metcalf v. Reynolds, 267 N.Y. 52, 195 N.E. 681 (1935) ; Naphtali v. Lafazan, 8 App. Div.
2d 22, 186 N.Y.S2d 1010 (1959) ; Ritchey v. Crudelle, 255 App. Div. 886, 7 N.Y.S2d 909
(1938) ; North Carolina: Desch v. Reeves, 163 F. Supp. 213 (M.D.N.C. 1958) ; Hale v.
Hale, 219 N.C. 191, 13 S.E2d 221 (1941) ; Brumsey v. Mathias, 216 N.C. 743, 6 S.E2d
495 (1940) ; Farfour v. Fahad, 214 N.C. 281, 199 S.E. 52L (1938) ; Wright v. Pettus, 209
N.C. 732, 184 S.E. 494 (1936); Oklahoma: Gill v. Hayes, 188 Okla. 343, 103 P.2d 117
(1940) ; Pennsylvania: Randall v. Stager, 355 Pa. 352, 49 A.2d 689 (1946) ; Mackey v.
Robertson, 328 Pa. 504, 195 Atl. 870 (1938); Mike v. Lan, 322 Pa. 353, 185 Ad. 775
(1936); Tennessee: Hoover v. Harris, 177 Tenn. 467, 151 S.%V2d 152 (1941); 1fiest Vir-
ginia: White v. Hall, 118 W. Va. 85, 188 S.E. 768 (1936) ; Wood v. Shrewsbury, 117 W.
Va. 589, 186 S.E. 294 (1936) ; Wisconsin: Urban v. Chars, 1 Wis. 2d 582, 85 NAV2d 386
(1957).
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forum state. But courts which have so far limited themselves to the applica-
tion of foreign common law may well have been motivated by distrust of a
legislative enactment which they viewed as primarily brought about by power-
ful lobbies, rather than 'by adherence to general precepts. Only twelve juris-
dictions have applied the foreign guest statute in preference to the common
law of the forum. In the absence of reasoned decisions, it must be assumed
that the results in these jurisdictions were determined 'by an unconditional
acceptance of the vested rights theory of the Restatement.4 1 But it may be
hoped that these jurisdictions, as well as all others, will ultimately follow the
lead which the highest courts of at least four states 42 have taken in similar
contexts and discard the Restatement "rule" "in conformity with principles
of equity and justice, '4 3 at least where the protection of citizens of the forum
state so requires. They will then cease to deprive passengers in fully insured
cars of their claims against the insurers of their hosts by virtue of a totally
unwarranted reference to the law of a fortuitous place of accident.
44
In the vast majority of cases, the forum in guest-host litigation is the state
of the plaintiff's and defendant's common domicile. Here, as all through the
law of torts, the lex fori is the law properly applicable, and the English con-
flicts rule under which the lex loci comes into play only as a defense on cer-
tain limited issues 45 would supply a rational decision. 40 But this rule fails not
41. But cf. Smoot v. Fisher, 248 S.W.2d 38 (Mo. Ct. App. 1952) (arrives at applying
the common law of the forum by a peculiar theory of a "concurrent jurisdiction" of the
states of forum and accident over an accident occurring on a bridge over the Mississippi);
Gridley v. Cardenas, 3 Wis. 2d 623, 89 N.W.2d 286 (1958) (refusing to apply a guest
statute of the place of accident to an aircraft).
42. Emery v. Emery, 45 Cal. 2d 421, 289 P.2d 218 (1955) (rejecting lex loci rule of
parental immunity) ; Schmidt v. Driscoll Hotel, Inc., 249 Minn. 376, 82 N.W.2d 365 (1957)
(dramshp act); Koplik v. C. P. Trucking Corp., 27 N.J. 1, 141 A,2d 34 (1958) (inter-
spousal immunity); Haumschild v. Continental Cas. Co., 7 Wis. 2d 130, 95 N.W.2d 814
(1959) (same); see Stumberg, "The Place of the Wrong": Torts and the Conflict of Laws,
34 WASH. L. Ray. 388, 391 (1959).
43. Schmidt v. Driscoll Hotel, Inc., 249 Minn. 376, 380, 82 N.W.2d 365, 368 (1957).
44. For a case demonstrating the fortuitous character of the place-of-harm rule in
relation to other facets of the host-guest relation, see Flynn v. Little, 141. N.E.2d 182
(Ohio Ct. App. 1957) (Ohio parties subjected to guest's duty to protest under PennsylvanIa
law). See also Stotzheim v. Djos, 98 N.W.2d 129 (Minn. 1959) (guest's assumptIon of
risk, laws -probably identical).
45. Note 15 supra and accompanying text.
46. -See McLean v. Pettigrew, [1945] Can. Sup. Ct. 62, [1945] 2 D.LR. 65 (1944)
(negligence liability under Quebec law for Ontario accident of Quebec citizens notwith-
standing Ontario guest statute which was interpreted as not "justifying" the defendant's
conduct). See also Heighington, Conflict of Laws in dutomobile Neg9ligence Cases, f4
CAN. B. Ray. 389, 396-97 (1936) ; Palmer, Torts in the Inter-Provincial Conflict of Laws,
17 U. ToR. FAciTry L. Rrv. 1. (1959); Richardson, Problens in Conflict of Laws Relat-
ing to Automwbiles, 13 CAN. B. Ray. 200, 203 (1935) ; Spence, Conflict of Laws it; Auto-
iiwbile Negligence Cases, 27 CAN. B. Rav. 661, 674 (1949).
The only state to reach this result in this country, though with a different reasoning,
seems to be Georgia. Slaton v. Hall, 168 Ga. 710, 148 S.E. 741 (1929). But see Hamby v.
Hamby, 110 S.E.2d 133 (Ga. Ct. App. 1959).
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only in cases in which the parties are domiciled in different states but also in
certain other situations which are prompted by an unsatisfactory law of juris-
diction. Thus there is no reason why a defendant "caught" in a common-law
jurisdiction, or his insurer, should be fully liable although his own law would
have limited the claim to one for gross negligence. Until reform of our law
of jurisdiction, now in progress, will have enabled the defendant in such cases
to obtain dismissal by the inconvenient forum,4 7 the remedy must be provided
by a choice-of-law rule. And such a rule will continue to be required when
the parties are domiciled in different states.
Among the primary interests in this choice are the interests of the host in
procuring liability insurance adequate under the applicable law, and the in-
terests of his insurer in reasonable calculability of the premium. These inter-
ests are not properly served by reference to either the law of the fortuitous
place of accident or the law of a possibly equally fortuitous forum or by a
usually inconclusive reference to the law "preferable" on grounds of policy. I
submit that those decisions have pointed the way which, as to other "im-
munities," have subjected automobile accidents to the law of the place of the
parties' common domicile.4 8 They have pointed the way but not traveled it.
For, to refer to the law of domicile as such simply stresses another fortuitous
contact. To be sure, this reference will usually reach satisfactory results. But
it will do so because the common domicile usually coincides with the place
where the insured car is permanently kept. It is the law of that place whose
application may be anticipated and insured against by both host and guest.
And it is the application of this law alone which will be justified where the
common-domicile rule would fail, as for instance, where either party's domicile
was acquired after the issuance of the policy or in those rare cases in which
the parties' domiciles have remained in different states.
To be sure, the host's liability and the guest's recovery will then continue
to vary from state to state, but these variations, in contrast to those follow-
ing the law of the place of accident, will be of a kind which both host and
guest can take into account in arranging their own insurance programs. If,
on the one hand, the car is 'kept in a common-law jurisdiction, the prospec-
tive host will, or could, secure insurance to protect himself against liability
for his ordinary negligence wherever it may result in injury, and his insurer
will or could calculate his premium accordingly. If, on the other hand, the car
is permanently kept in a state which has enacted a guest statute, the host
will or could arrange his protection with a view to that statute without fear
of being subjected to a broader liability in a common-law state. His insurer
will or could calculate his premium accordingly. And the prospective guest,
aware of his limited protection, will or could be expected to purchase his own
47. See generally EaRmEzwEiG, CoNFLIcr oF LAws 72-80, 119-37 (1959).
48. Cases cited note 29 =upra; Grant v. McAuliffe, 41 Cal. 2d 859, 264 P.2d 944 (1953).
See also CooK, THE LOGICAL AxD LEGAL BASES OF THE CoiFrucr OF LAws 250 (1942);
Currie, Survival of Actions: Adjudication Versus Autotation in the Conflict of Laws,
10 STAN. L. REv. 205 (1958) ; writings cited note 6 mspra.
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accident insurance. Since, in the great majority of jurisdictions, the case law
is still open to this interpretation, it may be hoped that courts will find it
possible to adopt the rule here proposed-to which there is no barrier except
the Restatement of the Law of Conflict of Laws, that dogmatic deviation of
recent origin. Reasonable insurability "under the foreseeable law" could thus
become the rationale of both the Rule of, and an exception from, the lex fori.
Applicability of this rationale to two other important types of enterprise lia-
bility will be discussed in later Articles of this series.
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